19 September 2008

Eugene Kaspersky on the Latest Malware Trends

I was fortunate enough to catch up with the one and only Eugene Kaspersky this week. Eugene is one of the world's leading experts in the information security field, co-founder and CEO of Kaspersky Lab, the international information security software vendor and a technology leader in malware protection. (malware: malicious software such as trojans, viruses, keyloggers) protection.


It was a real privilege and honour to chat with the Moscow based Security Guru about the latest malware patterns, trends and threats being monitored by Kaspersky Lab. I do not use the term “Security Guru” lightly either, Eugene is a graduate of the Institute of Cryptography, Telecommunications and Computer Science and has conducted scientific research in these areas before entering the antivirus industry (before it was an industry) in 1991. This was after his interest in viruses was sparked when his own system was infected by the Cascade virus in 1989.

I remember my Commodore Amiga being infected by a boot sector virus around the same time, if only I had the same kind of vision back then. Actually one of the new trends being observed by Kaspersky Lab was the return of the old boot sector virus. The reason behind this trend is if the “bad guys” can load and execute the malware ahead of the loading of the operating system, OS security protection and antivirus, it makes it much easier to deliver the malware payload and avoid detection, and even actually prevent the security countermeasures from operating properly.

Kaspersky underlined a fact I myself have been preaching for a number of years now, in that the people behind these global malware attacks are becoming more professional, organised and are financially motivated, as opposed to being out to cause system crashes for kudos. The traditional idea of a teenage spotty faced kid sat in his bedroom bringing down TV networks for fun is a myth, these guys are in it for the easy money.

The evidence of this financial motivation can be clearly be seen in the Kaspersky Labs statistics, which shows 90% of Internet malware as being spyware trojans, designed to steal information, whether it be credit card details, login credentials or general personal details. No longer do cyber criminals have any interest in bringing down systems either, which is why only 5% of malware are the traditional “trouble making” viruses. These bad guys actually want their target systems to stay online for as long as possible, so they can be fully exploited. Such is the lucrative nature of these attacks and high rewards of this dark economy, the cyber criminals are even aggressively competing against each other, with malware actually attacking and "killing" other malware to gain supremacy. How much malware is out there to be protected against? Well today Kaspersky Labs are protecting against 1.250 million and rising, which shows the scale of the malware problem. I remember when my AV signature list had a couple of a hundred types of viruses listed in it, you could scroll through the list and look at the names and what they did!

I asked Eugene one particular question which has being puzzling me with Antivirus protection for some time…given that most malware is targeted against Microsoft operating systems and applications, which these days tend to offer better protection (arguably), how come malware trends are not shifting to target the lower hanging fruit more, in non-Microsoft operating systems, especially given the recent popularity and rise of freeware (Linux) and Apple systems in recent years. Eugene pointed out there was an increasing trend in the number of malware specifically targeting Apple systems, while on the Linux front, he said with a big grin, that Linux users tended to be more skilled, security savvy and wise, therefore less prone to being successfully breached by malware. In my own summary, the successful malware attacks occur against the "dumb users", who tend to be a Microsoft system, or increasingly an Apple system. This makes perfect sense, as after all the biggest gap in security lies between the keyboard and the back of the chair.

Eugene went on to say there was a shift towards malware specifically aimed at mobile devices. These days there is a lot of valuable information held on mobile devices, while typically they tend not to have good protection against malware, which can be delivered to the device through the Internet connectivity. On top of this mobile devices are being increasingly used for making payment transactions, with payment card information being highly targeted by cyber fraudsters.

Kaspersky also highlighted another very interesting global malware trend, which is being driven through the deployment of cheap hardware and fast Internet access to the developing parts of the world, the $100 laptop for example. New malware threats are increasingly originating from places like Latin American and Africa. However over 50% of malware is still coming from out of China, but the overall problem is still rising. Kaspersky went on to describe a “division of labour” in the malware black market, with cyber criminal groups specialising in different areas and collaborating. Typically groups are dividing and specialising in areas such as writing the malware code, malware deployment, malware management (those bot-herders) and data hijacking/data mining, which really underlines how organised this black market is now becoming. Also Kaspersky Lab has observed general differences in the types of malware targets around the globe, with South East Asia specialising in online gaming fraud, Latin America developing banking Trojans, while Russia appears to be the place where a lot of malicious code is written and sold on.

Fascinating stuff and it goes to emphasize the importance of running antivirus or a complete security suite on your computer systems, and ensuring such systems are automatically kept up-to-date. So there you have it, Eugene Kaspersky, Security Guru and a great down to earth guy, I thoroughly recommend going to hear him speak if you get the opportunity.

You can obtain a Free Trial of the awarding winning Kaspersky Internet Security 2009 http://www.kaspersky.com/homeuser

07 September 2008

Credit Crunch to drive UK Cyber Crime

As the effects of the “global credit crunch” starts to take hold in the UK, it is evident to me that UK focused “Cyber Crime” will sharply increase as a result. Over the past ten years the UK economy has been in a honey-moon period, and doing relatively well, with the GDP growth out pacing the rest of EU. The good and steady economic environment has resulted in low unemployment figures for much of the last decade. You really have to go back to the late 1990’s since the last major loll in the UK economy.

In comparison, mass market cyber crime for financial gain hardily existed ten years ago, and certainly was not on the radar during the last major recession in 1990’s. Over the last decade Internet access and usage for the average UK person has radically changed, thanks to the explosion of broadband, which in turn has resulted in providing cyber crime opportunities around every corner.

Within the Security Industry it is commonly known hackers have been increasinly focusing their efforts on attacks which yield financial rewards as opposed to the traditional attacks for the challenge, fun, or kudos. For example the number of original viruses being created for the sake of causing disruption, which often has no financial benefit for the perpetrator has been dropping, while attacks for financial gain for the perpetrator, such web application attacks, phishing Emails and key loggers installations have been rapidly raising in the last few years. On the back of this, the amount of personal information being placed and made available on the internet is increasing, providing a rich gold mine for cyber fraudsters and identity thieves.

There are many analysts and reports stating economic slowdown and raising employment results in increases in crime, and in particularly fraud crime. http://uk.news.yahoo.com/afp/20080901/tpl-britain-politics-economy-crime-5b839a9.html Fraud crime fits cyber crime like a glove. Putting this economy and crime trends together with the trends in security and cyber crime with financial motivation (fraud), since the last major economic slow down in the UK, I can only conclude one obvious outcome, namely the credit crunch will drive a serious increase in cyber crime in the UK. It will be very interesting to see if the future official figures on UK online card fraud reflects this trend. Just about every person I have spoken to about cyber crime fraud in recent months has themselves, or knows a family member, friend, or work colleague, who has been "done" with credit card fraud as a result of something which occurred online during the last 12 months.

So I urge everyone in the UK to buckle up their anti-malware software, check their paper shredders, to be eagle-eyed reviewing credit card/bank statements and to keep extra vigilant when online as we sail through the choppy water of the credit crunch.

09 July 2008

Security is a Process, not a Product


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Back in the year 2000, I remember reading an article by Bruce Schneier (a security hero of mine), he said "Security is a Process, not a Product". Bruce talked about whether this would be ever understood. It really struck a chord with me at the time and I've been quoting Bruce saying that ever since in my own presentations. Well 8 years have gone by since I first read it, and Information Security has certainly come to the fore in that time, but Bruce's statement rings truer than ever.

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0005.html

I don't want to come across as knocking the security industry because they do provide many great security products and services, but in the industry’s push to sell products and solutions, I think they are help driving the concept, that the answer to all information security problems is to simply buy a product off the shelf.

The number of times I've been at security events and conferences, where the “punters” are repeatedly told, “buy our product and your security problem will go away overnight, but if you don’t buy, something nasty will definitely happen”.
I have to say part of the problem is down to the punters going out impulse buying “off the peg security products” tend not to understand what information security is about in the first place. Often they are looking to the security industry, and those pesky sales guy for security advice. In fact the sales tactic is to often host a “free security advice/awareness” session, to draw in the punters. I show up to some of these events to gage where the market and how threats are perceived to be moving, but it really makes me cringe at times, especially as the message is increasingly to buy this and you will be secure! And it gets worst, as some companies are clearly jumping on the security bandwagon to make a quick buck. At InfoSec Europe this year, I heard one (so called) security organisation openly presenting about PCI Data Security Standard to a bunch folk who gauging from their questions really didn’t know anything about the standard, other than it effected their business. This company were out and out misleading those listening, and it was clear to me the presenter didn’t even know the proper facts about PCI DSS. In fact I was so outraged in what I overheard, I stopped, blended in with punters, and at the right moment asked a question about requirement 6.6 to deliberately trip them up, I asked “so which is best on requirement 6.6 in your expert opinon a code review or an application firewall? and why?” – they didn’t have a clue, anyone knowing and working with PCI DSS would instantly know and understand the issue around Req. 6.6 in mid 2008.
I think the answer is for the “punters”, namely the organisations which lets face, many of whom are just really waking up to the issue of information security, is to train and invest on security a department and personnel. So they are correctly advised on the proper solution processes from the ground up, as well as to understand when and where they should buy products off the shelf to help reduce security risk along the way.

01 July 2008

The NHS just doesn't "do" Information Security

I said this before, and I'll probably say it again a few more times, "The NHS just doesn't "do" Information Security".

The latest in a catalogue of NHS breaches involved a Senior Manager who had his laptop stolen, but the laptop held over 21000 records of Essex patients.

The same old problem with a laptop breach...

1. No Hard Disk Encryption - Password Protection is almost no protection, it's very easy to bypass Windows passwords, pretty much anyone who can type into Google can manage to achieve it.
2. Poor Information Management. We have a vast amount of Sensitive Data which has been allowed to be "copied" from a central IT system to a laptop.
Should the Manager have access to that much information? Should he be allowed to export that much information from the host system? Probably not. Who else can access and take a copy of this data? What's to stop someone putting it onto a £6 flash drive?

I have friends who work in the NHS, they tell me the NHS has no culture or awareness towards protecting the vast amount of personal and lets face it, highly sensitive information which the NHS holds and processes. I'm not saying keeping people alive is less important than investing in information security, but that's the problem, a lack of investment (money) and that's why there will continue to be serious data breaches involving the NHS . But consider this, soon the NHS will be storing our DNA profiles on their systems as well...

I'll finish on a positive note with this data breach, as I'm being far too negative lately, good for the NHS for disclosing and letting the people who are affected know in a decent time frame, well they had plenty of practice - right?

19 June 2008

Mod Data Breaches & the Human Security Element

In the last few days we have seen a gulch of data breaches by the Ministry of Defence and the UK Government, all involving employees leaving highly sensitive and top secret documents on trains. These documents included details about terrorists, wars and organised crime. When analysing these separated cases it is clear the documents in each breach should not of been removed from their secure environments by the employees in the first place, let alone left in a public environment.

These breaches are the classic internal human data breach examples, and shows even the most security conscious bodies such as the Ministry of Defence are always struggling to deal and contain the human security factor. Sooner or later in the process security tends to be reliant on a human being, it is extremely difficult, expensive and can also introduce highly inconvenient trade offs to secure the human interaction, especially when it comes to preventing the removal of physical documents from a site. Even drilling in security awareness to staff offers little guarantee, as there are always individuals who either don't grasp the importance of the message or share the organisations appetite to taking risks. If you think about it, there are just some people in our society who are naturally big risk takers, I'm talking about those people who strap elastic bands to their feet and jump off cliffs, or that boy racer driving a Vauxhall Nova 1.0 who insists on barely over taking you on busy single carriage in the face of oncoming traffic, and pretty much anyone who rides 500cc+ motor cycle.

Part of the security defence against the human element is having a deterrent, so in each of these recent cases we know the employee in question has been suspended (likely pending firing), I'm sure the deterrent in these organisations are well know, if you work the Mod and responsible for a serious data breach, I know your MoD career is pretty much over. But this only goes to prove deterrent is not enough, as deterrent can't actually physically prevent someone from making the decision and physically walking off site with the secret docs.

There are always security measures that can be introduced to prevent these particular action, such as restricting sensitive documents to a need to know basis, but we must accept taking risks and bad judgement is just part of the human condition, and will always be an insolvable security problem facing any organisation, because you simply cannot take the human element out of the equation and there is always a point when apply security measures where cost and trades offs become too great.