Tuesday, 18 November 2014

MS14-066: To Patch or Not to Patch?

Note: Since I originally posted this, Microsoft have updated the MS14-066 patch, which they say now resolves the issues the original patch caused.

A week ago (11th November 2014) Microsoft released a patch for of the one most critical Microsoft vulnerabilities seen in a long time – MS14-066. The vulnerability is in the Schannel (Microsoft Secure Channel) component, which is present in pretty much every version of Microsoft Windows, including the unsupported Windows XP and NT. The vulnerability may allow remote code execution by an attacker, but what makes this vulnerability stand out as a particularly more serious than the typical Microsoft remote code execution vulnerabilities, is it can be exploited directly via a network connection, and there is nothing which can be done to mitigate it, other than switching off or network disconnecting your Windows system.

Microsoft Windows servers and services that have direct Internet connectivity pose the highest risk, whether they be ISS web servers or VPN services, unpatched against MS14-066, they are at high risk of exploitation. But that is not to say users of Windows OS on desktops and laptops are not at serious risk as well.

Therefore it should be a complete ‘no brainer’ for business to quickly apply the MS14-066 patch, but a curveball has been thrown, in that there has been reports of server issues occurring after applying the patch, specifically with TLS 1.2 causing services to hang or to disconnect. Microsoft have published a work around for this issue, which involves deleting the following ciphers from the registry, a simple enough fix.

TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

So to the question I have been asked quite a bit this week, should this patch be applied now or should we wait until Microsoft release a more reliable patch?

Well firstly a golden rule of patching critical servers is to test the patch first, as patching always carries a risk of impacting the availability of services and breaking applications. The TLS 1.2 issue is straightforward to test for and simple enough to resolve if found to be a problem in testing.

Another golden rule of patching is to have a back-out plan, any patch carries a risk of breaking systems and applications, even with testing, so there should always be written plan to roll back critical systems should a patch cause an issue.

The ‘whether to patch now’ question becomes even more clear-cut when you consider it this way; with this vulnerability remaining present (unpatched), it means there is a significant risk for the compromise of confidentiality & integrity, whereas applying the patch carries a risk of losing server/service availability. 

High Risk of Confidentiality Compromise (unpatched) Vs Low Risk of Availability (patched)

Availability rarely trumps confidentiality in InfoSec, and in my view it certainly doesn’t in this scenario when weighing up the risk of not applying the patch, remember there is nothing that can be done to mitigate the risk of an unpatched system, other than applying the patch.

Therefore my conclusion is to quickly apply the patch to all Windows OS, testing for TLS 1.2 issue with any critical systems, and to start with patching all Microsoft OS Internet facing services first.

Sunday, 28 September 2014

Why the UK Needs More Cyber Professionals

I am a huge fan of well a made Infographic, as they make an effective method to quickly convey issues backed by statistics, so when Norwich University’s Online Masters Degree in Information Assurance sent me a compelling Infographic they created on 'Why the US Needs More Cyber Professionals', I'd thought it would be very handy to share it. 

The Norwich University Infographic might have 'US' in the title and talk about dollar costs, but you can easily substitute 'US' to 'UK' and the $s to £s, as in the UK we too are facing a serious skills shortage of Cyber Security Professionals, just ask any InfoSec recruiter. The Infographic shows the demand for cyber security professionals has grown 3.5 times faster than the demand for other Information Technology professionals in the past five years. This is the simple economics of demand exceeding supply, which is leaving businesses with rudderless information security management and practises, this in turn eventually leads to needles and expensive compromises.

The question is what is going to be done to tackle this issue, how can we produce a continuous crop of significant numbers of Information Security professionals to keep pace with the demand of UK business.

Sunday, 21 September 2014

InfoSec Blogs You Should Be Reading

The Security Innovation Europe Blog has listed 40 Information Security Blogs You Should Be Reading, which lists some of the best InfoSec bloggers around, and myself. So if you are lacking a bit of information security reading or just want an alternative opinion to the mainstream media InfoSec FUD, you know where to go.

Friday, 18 July 2014

A developer's guide to complying with PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 6

I have written the following article for IBM which was published on IBM's DeveloperWorks
A developer's guide to complying with PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 6 (website)

A developer's guide to complying with PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 6 (PDF)

The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is a highly prescriptive technical standard, which is aimed at the protection of debit and credit card details, which is referred to within the payments industry as cardholder data. The objective of the standard is to prevent payment card fraud, by securing cardholder data within organizations that either accept card payments, or are involved in the handling of cardholder data. PCI DSS consists of 12 sections of requirements, and usually responsibility for compliance rests with IT infrastructure support. PCI DSS requirement 6, however, breaks down into 28 individual requirements, and sits squarely with software developers involved in the development of applications that process, store, and transmit cardholder data. PCI compliance heavily revolves around IT services. IT focused compliance managers that are tasked with achieving compliance within organizations, often lack the required software developer knowledge and experience to help assure that the application development meets the arduous requirements of PCI DSS.

Sunday, 6 July 2014

Xbox One & PS4 Gamer Security

From the very first moment gamers played online, their accounts have been targeted by hackers. But hacking gamer accounts is no longer just about revenge and community kudos. There is serious money to be made from stealing access to gamer accounts, ranging from selling virtual gaming items and gaming currency for real money, to stealing bank account & credit card details. It is a subject I have touched upon several times over the years:

How to keep your Final Fantasy XIV Online Account Safe & Secure
PlayStation Hack: PSN Gamers Security Help
Is Club Penguin Safe for my Child?
World of Warcraft: Does the Internet have controllable Borders?

Last year's launches of Microsoft's Xbox One and Sony's PS4 consoles, have swelled the number of online gamers into millions, so is gamer security a problem that is set to raise? 

Yes, and no, I think online console gaming security has improved in recent years, as Microsoft and Sony understand a secure online gaming network is an essential part of their billion pound business model. Poor online gaming availability and the loss of trust by the millions of gamers using their gaming consoles and services, equates to a significant loss of revenue, so their motivation for having a decent level of security to protect their gaming systems is clear to see.

There will always be cases of third party gaming websites that are breached, which result in gamer account details being compromised on mass. Website security is an issue that is not going to go away any time soon, regardless of the industry.

New gamers need to be continually educated about the third party risk to their accounts, as many assume there is none.  Gamers need to be aware of the various pitfalls enacted by scammers seeking access their valuable gaming accounts. The most common gaming account thefts occur due to phishing scams, trojan horse websites & forums, and dodgy third party game plug-ins.

MicroTrend has kindly provided the following "Ahead of the Game" InfoGraphic on gamer security, there's some big numbers in there.



Sunday, 22 June 2014

Scan your app to find & fix OWASP Top 10 2013 vulnerabilities

I have written the following article for IBM which was published on IBM's DeveloperWorks

Scan your app to find and fix OWASP Top 10 2013 vulnerabilities (website)

Scan your app to find and fix OWASP Top 10 2013 vulnerabilities (PDF)

Today's modern web applications are more than a match for most desktop PC applications and continue to push boundaries by taking advantage of limitless cloud services. But more powerful web applications means more complicated code, and the more complicated the code, the greater the risk of coding flaws — which can lead to serious security vulnerabilities within the application. Web application vulnerabilities face exploitation by relentless malicious actors, bent on profiteering from data theft, or gaining online notoriety by causing mischief. This article looks at securing web applications by adopting industry best application development practices, such as the OWASP Top 10 and using web application vulnerability scanning tools.

Friday, 13 June 2014

Forget Windows XP, Does Unsupported Java pose a Greater Risk to the Enterprise?

Recent research shows 76% of enterprises analysed by Cisco has Java version 6, which Oracle stopped supporting in February 2013, 14 months before the highly publicised end of Windows XP support by Microsoft. Running unsupported Java is arguably a far more risky affair than unsupported Windows XP in the enterprise, and according the Cisco 2014 Annual Security report, the Java problem is going under the security radar.

As most Cyber Security professional will tell you, you should avoid installing Java unless you really have to have it, as the exploitation of Java vulnerabilities is a typical culprit behind web-based desktop compromises. Recent data from Sourcefire shows that Java exploits make up a staggering 91% indicators of compromise.


The Java Applet Risk
The highest area of risk with Java lies with Java applets (applications) which are executed within a web browser. The intent is for Java applets to operate in a safe sandbox within the confines of the web browser, so limiting the applet’s interaction with the operating system. But this intent does not matchup to reality, as hackers are able to write malicious website Java applets which exploit Java vulnerabilities, leading to compromise of the operating system hosting the web browser. Due to the compatible nature of Java, hackers are able to attack most web browsers and most operating systems.

Myth Busting: Java has nothing to do with Javascripts. Disabling Java in your web browser or removing Java from your system, will not break the vast majority of websites online.

Why old versions of Java are still Present in the Enterprise
The reasons why unsupported versions of Java are still present in the enterprise, can be often attributed to internal business applications and custom written Java apps, which simply do not work with the latest versions of Java. In other cases it is a lack of desktop application patch management and desktop application control which is to blame, this is often coupled with low awareness and understanding.

Managing and Mitigating the Enterprise Java Risk

The first course of action is to understand the extent of Java installations within the enterprise, this can be achieved by using application auditing tools to ascertain Java installations, including version numbers and patch level. Next is to review the business reason for each Java installation, ensuring there is a valid reason for its presence, namely to run a specific business application. S
ometimes Java is a legacy presence for applications which are no longer used or exist. If there is no reason for Java to be there, remove it and then prevent users from installing it. It is surprising how many users are duped into installing Java on their desktops when visiting websites, when they don’t actually require it.

Where Java is required for an application, verify if the application is web browser based. If not, disable Java from running within the web browser, preferably by enforcing it using enterprise management tools. This significantly reduces the risk, as it is the potential of users executing untrusted Java applets while visiting dodgy websites online which poses the greatest risk with unsupported Java versions.

Where applications are reliant on old Java versions, it can be just a question of raising the issue with developers and suppliers, and pushing them into making their applications and applets compatible with the latest versions of Java. Sometimes there are cost issues here, as developers tend to charge for software upgrades, however there really shouldn't be any excuse for applications not to be continually supported to be secure of vulnerabilities as part of their life-cycle of use. An application that doesn't work with any of Oracle's supported versions of Java, can be regarded as having its own security vulnerability. Continued patching of systems and applications is a fundamental enterprise security best practice, neglecting patching leaves doors of vulnerabilities open for cyber attackers to exploit.

The post is brought to you by Cisco

Sunday, 8 June 2014

You’re so hacked, you don’t even know it!

The standard information security management doctrine is to consider the internal IT infrastructure as a secure trusted zone, free from any malicious third party compromise. But the reality is different, as network intrusions, malware infections, data thefts and other malicious activities are not being detected within most UK business networks. According to the Cisco 2014 Annual Security Report, 100% of business networks analyzed by Cisco, have traffic going to websites that host malware.

Sophisticated and expensive security monitoring may well be implemented to detect malicious activity, but in my experience, monitoring and alerting systems are often poorly configured and not correctly base-lined. This results in the security staff being bombarded with a steady stream of false positive alerts, which completely hampers their ability to spot actual attacks. Security monitoring can also lure the business into a false sense of security, take File Integrity Monitoring (FIM), an excellent tool for detecting malware on IT systems, that is unless the malware operates in RAM, and uses unmonitored temporary files, in which case FIM is never going to detected it. Anti-virus (AV) is a security staple for detecting and preventing malware within nearly all businesses. But anti-virus protection has become an endless losing game of cat and mouse, with AV companies analysing over 150,000 pieces of new malware every day, they are struggling to keep pace. While expert hackers that specifically target businesses, will take the time to customise and fully test their tools and malware, to ensure AV and monitoring systems do not detect their malicious activities.

Security Monitoring Alerts - Can't see the wood for the trees

Many of the recent high profile data breaches, have involved hackers going unnoticed and freely operating inside company networks for months on end. Networks which were assumed to be secure.

For instance Target’s IT systems were first compromised by hackers on 12th November 2013. The intruders were able to test their credit card stealing malware on a selection of Target’s Point-of-Sale (POS) systems for several days, before deploying their malware onto POS systems within all of Target’s 1800 stores, just in time for the busy black Friday shopping weekend. Over the next few weeks the hackers stole 40 million credit card details and 70 million records of customer information, a whole month passed before the breach was eventually detected. The breach wasn’t spotted by Target either, they were informed by the US Department of Justice, after several banks had noticed a massive spike in fraud involving over a million credit cards. All the credit cards used in these fraudulent transactions had one thing in common; they all had been used for purchases at Target stores.

The subsequent forensic investigation of Target, discovered the hacker’s intrusion was detected and logged from the 12th November onwards, however Target’s staff failed to notice and react to their security monitoring system’s alerts. This failure in detection and response is exactly what any hacker stealing information desires. In the case of the Target data theft, the hackers are racing against a ticking clock to monetize the stolen credit card data as much as possible, before the banks learn of the compromise. As soon as the banks establish credit cards have been compromised, they cancel and re-issue the stolen credit cards, which significantly devalues the credit card data stolen.

Target’s failure to spot the breach has cost them dear, if the breach was detected earlier, the amount of data stolen would be far more limited, meaning fines, which are based on the cost incurred to replace the stolen cards, would have been much less. But as it stands, Target has already spent $61 million in dealing with the breach, with another $100 million planned. This has resulted in Target’s like-for-like fourth quarter profits for 2013, to be massively down, along with their share-price. When data breaches of this scale and calamity significantly hit the business bottom line, the buck stops with those ultimately responsible in the boardroom. Inevitably in Target’s case heads rolled, not only did this breach cost the CISO his job, but it led to the CEO being fired as well.
The same story of failing to detect malicious activity rings true with many of the other recent big data breaches. A massive 145 million eBay customer account records were stolen by hackers in February 2014, it was almost 3 months before eBay discovered the breach. 158 million records was stolen from Adobe in September 2013, a whole month had passed before Adobe discovered this huge data loss, but only after hackers had posted all their stolen data online.

There are many UK businesses right now, regardless of their size, industry and security posture, have compromised IT systems and data losses going unnoticed. Right now there are dark websites, forums and chat rooms where global cyber criminals are trading access to, and use of, UK business IT systems.

The lesson is to never to assume the internal networks are secure, in fact the real lesson is to always assume the opposite. Thinking in this way takes you down the road of a more proactive form of information security management. For instance adopting more proactive security techniques like cyber intelligence, by finding out what hackers already know about your organisation, what they might be planning, and then counteracting, can help nip potential serious security incidents in the bud.

The cyber threat landscape is growing at an alarming rate, fuelled by the continued business adoption of mobility and cloud services. These increasing attack surfaces present the hackers with a new world of opportunities to steal information for self-profit. Information technological change presents new challenges for cyber security, a more proactive approach is required to keep up with the highly agile cyber criminals.

The post is brought to you by Cisco

Tuesday, 3 June 2014

SC Congress: POS Breaches, Target & PCI DSS Compliance

I was privileged to speak at the SC Congress in London today. I was asked to talk about my views on Point of Sale (POS) credit card data breaches which had recently occurred stateside, the role of PCI DSS compliance with such breaches, and whether the UK could expect similar breaches despite widespread adoption of Chip & Pin (EMV), and what are the lessons to be learnt. 


The following is a summary of what I said.

In the United States there has been a number of high profile Point of Sale (POS) credit card data breaches, occurring at around seven shopping chains towards the end of last year. The most provident of these breaches was at Target, where hackers stole an estimated 40 million credit card details.  The hackers managed to load credit card data stealing malware onto Target’s POS systems, in each of Target’s 1800 stores. It is one of the largest and most sophisticated data breaches the payment card industry has ever seen.

As Target cashiers swiped customer’s credit cards on a POS, which is essentially a workstation with a magnetic swipe card reader, the credit card data, which is in clear text on the magnetic stripe on the back of the card, is loaded into the POS RAM. At this point the malware on the POS would copy the contents of the RAM, this is known as RAM scrapping. The malware then moves the credit card data out of the Target network into the hands of the attackers, who sell them on to card fraudsters at a profit.

But there is much more to this breach than the POS malware, to better understand this, we need to rollback the timeline of start the breach process, to see how the attackers got the malware onto the POS systems in the first place.

It all starts with Fazio Heating & Cooling LCC, a company providing Heating, Ventilation and Air Condition (HVAC) services to Target. Target have provided Fazio with remote access into their network, to allow Fazio to perform ebilling and exchange project management information. It is understood this network access was a basic remote access system, it is suggested it could be as simple as an RDP connection, with Fazio remote accessing into a Target server using a username and password.  At some point in 2013, Fazio was subjected to a cyber attack, its employees were sent phishing emails laced with malware. This attack resulted in the theft of the Target remote access credentials. It is likely these remote access credentials were offered for sale online and then bought by the would-be card hackers, this is my assumption.

In mid November 2013 the attackers supposedly used the Fazio credentials to access the Target network. It is not clear whether Target had a flat network or had their payment systems network segmented from their corporate systems, my assumption would be the payment environment and store POS systems would have been network segmented, but we can’t be certain. Either way the attackers managed to gain access to Target’s payment network and POS systems within all 1800 stores.  The attackers likely spent the first few days customizing and testing their POS malware. The POS malware itself was probably purchased from a third party, there are suggestions it was a malware kit known as Black POS, which was written and sold by Russian teenager for couple thousand dollars.

Once the attackers had finished testing and had the POS malware successfully performing, they then used Target’s own systems to deploy the malware onto POS systems within all of Target’s 1800 stores.  At this point it is getting on to late November 2013, the busiest time of year for shopping in the US, think Black Friday. The POS malware lifted credit card details in the millions over the next few weeks. Meanwhile it is believed Target’s IT system’s logged and alerted this network intrusion, but there was no monitoring and reaction to these alerts by Target staff. Which is very good news for the attackers, as the clock is ticking for them to monetize credit card data before card issuers and banks learn of the data theft, which leads to the cancelation of stolen cards and the enabling of additional anti-fraud monitoring against possible compromised credit cards, all would significantly devalue the payment card data stolen.

The POS malware deposits the vast amount of card data onto compromised systems located around world, the hackers collate the data, and put them up for sale on ‘carding’ forums, chatrooms and websites in chunks, with individual cards sold for between $18 and $38, after which card details are used fraudulently.

After a couple of weeks of selling card data to fraudsters, the likes of Visa, Mastercard and banks spot a spike in fraud, since over million of the stolen cards are now being used in fraudulent transactions. They spot a common source with the fraud spike, in that the cards were all used at Target stores.  In mid December 2013, Target are contacted and told their payment systems have been compromised.  Target have no choice but to bring in forensic investigators, together with the involvement of law enforcement and the US secret service, go onto discover the POS malware, and also uncover that more than 70 million Target customer records (personal information) had also been stolen.

The PCI Compliance Factor
In September 2013, Target completed a Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) assessment by one of the largest PCI Qualified Security Assessor (QSA) companies. A PCI assessment, even by a seasoned QSA, is a sampling exercise, it doesn’t prove the entity being assessed is actually operating in a continued PCI DSS state, 24-7-365. A PCI DSS assessment boils down to a judgment of compliance, determined by interview questions, and the QSA reviewing sample from the environment. Nether–the-less Target tried to sue their QSA company due to the breach, but the lawsuit was quietly dropped a few weeks later.

It is highly doubtful that Target where operating in a PCI DSS compliance state at the time of the breach, given; remote access appeared not to use two factor authentication, there was poor third party management, poor network segmentation, poor system monitoring and reaction, etc. all are standout PCI DSS requirements. So you really can’t point the finger at the PCI DSS, so what of the QSA assessing compliance?  All QSAs have a ‘get out of jail free’ zero responsibility card when comes to PCI DSS assessments, perhaps you could question how thorough the PCI DSS assessment was, but without reviewing the actual documentation and Report on Compliance (RoC), there no way we can know.

The breach has really hit Target hard in terms of costs, the like for like Q4 profits was down significantly, with the company already shelling out $61million in dealing with the breach, and a further $100 million allocated for the upgrade of their POS systems to Chip and Pin. With the breach hurting the profits, it is little surprise to see CEO shown the door last month.

Could a POS breach happen in the UK?
Yes, and No. Skimming debit/credit card data from POS system is more difficult in the UK, given most POS systems use a dedicated separate chip and pin device, which is more often than not, is PCI-PTS security accredited. However if hackers gain access to the payment network of a company, then there are a multitude of attack methods that can be attempted to harvest credit card data on mass, they don’t need to attack the POS.

PCI DSS isn’t a broken standard, however we see in the new version, PCI DSS V3.0, released at the start of the year, that there is already a greater emphasis of third party management and penetration testing of network segmentation (from Jul 2015), two of the biggest areas of security weakness with Target.

I also spoke about my views on lack of plastic security evolution, pretty much as per my blog post – How the PaymentCard Industry could kill PCI DSS

My Closing Remarks
Debit/Credit card data should be regarded as toxic data by your business.  The data does not belong to the business and it does not belong to your clients. PCI DSS and the authorities around it, are only concerned with protection of their payment card data while in your business possession. Worst still, if you drop the security ball in protecting the payment card data, you pick up the tab in clearing up the mess. PCI DSS is mostly made up of best practice information security, but it is highly prescriptive in nature, and so isn’t an easy standard to fully comply with. PCI DSS compliance can be very costly to continually achieve, diverting your security budget away from protecting other forms of confidential data within the business.  The best course of action is to remove and/or reduce all payment card data within the business, using card scheme accredited payment service providers, can allow you to transfer risk over to them, while technologies like tokenization and end-to-end encryption, can help to keep the toxic payment card data and the required PCI DSS controls which go with it, at a bare minimum.

I was quoted in the media as saying:
“The best approach is to find ways of outsourcing all payment processes so that no payment card data is held or processed by the retailer"
"Alternatively, if payment card data cannot be avoided, ensure that it is encrypted from end to end so that even if systems are breached, attackers cannot use the data to commit fraud”